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Abstract
Individual participation in preventive care may depend on preventive health behavior in an indi-
viduals peer group. This paper analyzes the importance of social interactions in the context of new
social policies (PROGRESA) in Mexico that aim to increase the participation in di¤erent types of
preventive care. We follow the promising approach of analyzing social interactions in real world peer
groups. Identication of social interactions is based on a partial-population design.
Results indicate that PROGRESA succeeded in increasing preventive care usage among program
eligible households. In addition, endogenous social interactions increase preventive care usage both
among eligibles and non-eligibles for various types of prevention. The overall treatment e¤ect of
PROGRESA on prevention can be decomposed in a direct e¤ect related to nancial incentives and
an indirect e¤ect related to social interactions. The indirect e¤ect accounts for 10% up to 58% of the
total treatment e¤ect.
Keywords: preventive care; non-participation; social interactions; PROGRESA; partial-population
design; treatment e¤ects.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Health and income are two major constituents of individual well-being. The rst foundations for both
are laid during pregnancy and childhood. A vast literature describes the impact of good nutrition and
health in utero and in childhood on, amongst others, life expectancy, physical and cognitive development,
schooling outcomes, labour market opportunities, and income (see e.g. Behrman, 1996; Case et al.,
2002; Case et al. 2005; Currie, 2009; Currie & Madrian, 1999; Cutler et al., 2006; Van den Berg et al.,
2006). Children born in poor households are more likely to have worse health and begin life at a distinct
disadvantage in these di¤erent domains.1
Poverty was widespread in Mexico around 1997. Extreme poverty is concentrated in rural areas ac-
commodating about a quarter of the Mexican population, but 60% of the extreme poor (World Bank,
2004, 2005). In 1997, the Mexican government set up a new nationwide anti-poverty program, baptized
PROGRESA.2 The program is targeted at the extreme poor in rural areas and is designed as a condi-
tional cash transfer program, meaning that families receive social transfers conditional on the household
engaging in a set of behaviors. Program requirements include participation in perinatal care, child health
care and immunization, growth and weight monitoring of children, primary and secondary schooling,
adult preventive check-ups and nutrition monitoring and supplementation, and nally participation in
informational meetings where health and nutrition topics are discussed (pláticas). In this way, the pro-
gram tries to break the feedback mechanisms that lead to an intergenerational transmission of poverty.
By focussing on perinatal care, childrens health, nutrition, and schooling, the objective is to enhance
poor childrens human capital accumulation, and hence future opportunities. By providing monetary
resources to families in need and adult preventive care, current poverty is also alleviated.3
In this paper, we analyze the impact of PROGRESA on the participation in and usage of di¤erent
types of preventive care. We look at the use of deworming drugs, participation of females in cervical cancer
screening, take-up of blood sugar and blood pressure tests by adults, the weight and growth monitoring
of children, and child immunization. Despite a high burden of these diseases in Mexico compared to other
countries, participation in prevention was low or modest around the start of PROGRESA. Vaccination
1 It is not entirely clear whether the correlation between low parental socioeconomic status (SES) and the lower health
status of their children implies a causal relation or that a third factor causes both e¤ects. However evidence increasingly
indicates that low parental SES causes poor child health (Currie, 2009). Causality is important if one wants to create or
adjust policies to improve individual opportunities.
2PROGRESA is an acronym for Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion (the Education, Health and Nutrition
Program). The program was renamed Oportunidades in 2002, but since we use data from the period 1997-1999, we will
refer to PROGRESA.
3The monetary transfers are generally given to the mother of the family, under the implicit assumption that resources
managed by women are more likely to be used for schooling, nutrition and other family necessities than money controlled
by men.
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rates among children were an exception with over 90% vaccination coverage. Section 2 enters more into
details on health care usage in Mexico and shows that there was a need for improvement in the di¤erent
health domains. PROGRESA was an instrument of the Mexican government to increase preventive care
participation, and health care participation in general, and to change misperceptions on prevention among
the rural poor. An analysis of the program e¤ects on health indicates that PROGRESA had a signicant
positive e¤ect on both adults and childrens health (Barham, 2005, 2011; Gertler, 2000, 2004; Lagarde
et al., 2007; Ranganathan & Lagarde, 2012).
The primary focus in this paper is the role of social interactions4 on the individual or household
decision to participate in preventive care. Understanding how social interactions inuence behavior is
important for policymaking since they could reinforce or o¤set the direct (nancial) incentives given by a
social program to inuence the individual participation decision. Social interaction e¤ects might therefore
lead to higher or lower participation rates than otherwise expected and a social program might reach non-
targeted individuals and households through social spillovers. In combination with (temporary) direct
incentives for behavioral change, social interactions can move a society from a low adoption equilibrium
into a high adoption equilibrium (Kremer & Miguel, 2007). Once direct incentives are reduced, important
social interaction e¤ects can support the high participation equilibrium. This is especially important for
a country like Mexico characterized by low participation rates in di¤erent types of preventive care 
that aims at durably increasing participation rates.
Peer e¤ects might work through a variety of channels (see e.g. Oster & Thornton, 2012; Noguera et
al., 2013; Young, 2009). First, social interactions can be the result of informational conformity through
signaling5 or (implicit or explicit) information sharing on benets, costs or beliefs. Second, individual
decisions can be reinforced through a desire to t inwith others in the reference group or a pressure
to follow prevailing social practices. This has been named pure conformity or imitation.6 Individuals
might also learn how to use a drugs or product from their peers. Given that the preventive care that
is analyzed in this paper is either easy to apply (taking deworming drugs) or administered by a health
professional (vaccination, cancer screening, blood tests), learning is not expected to play an important
role. Informational and pure conformity on the other hand are likely to play a role in the decision making
process.
4A peer e¤ect or social interaction e¤ect occurs when the action or belief of one individual a¤ects the actions or beliefs
of other individuals belonging to the same social group.
5 (Non-)Participation in prevention by a peer might send a signal that prevention yields a higher (lower) level of utility.
This might encourage (discourage) participation.
6Puur conformity or imitation reects the idea that the best life is attained if one behaves as others in ones surrounding
and stays away from acting out of the ordinary. As Patacchini & Zenou (2009, pp. 2-3) note, it may well be best expressed
in the old saying: "When in Rome, do as the Romans do."
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Estimating peer e¤ects has proven to be challenging because of problems of reection, correlated
unobservables and endogenous group membership (Manski, 1993). It is di¢ cult to disentangle whether
an individual decision is inuenced by the decisions of her peers or vice versa, or that both the decisions
of the peers and the individual are driven by e.g. shared common individual characteristics, such as
income or education levels, or changes in the environment. A variety of techniques have been used
to rene estimates of how peer decisions inuence individual decisions. Early research estimated peer
e¤ects as the link between the propensity of the peer group to engage in a certain behavior and individual
behavior, while controlling for as many group characteristics as possible. Deri (2005) is an example of this
approach for health service utilization in Canada, Aizer & Currie (2004) analyze social network e¤ects for
participation in publicly funded prenatal care and delivery services. More recently, researchers use explicit
randomization, where a random subset of individuals is treateddi¤erently, and this random variation
is used as additional information to identify social interactions more accurately. This line of research
exists both for exogenously assigned peer groups and for existing peer groups. An example in health
economics of the former is Carrell et al. (2011) who analyze tness outcomes among students at the US
Air Force academy who are randomly assigned to squadrons. The problem with this type of study is that
peer groups are sometimes created articially and it is di¢ cult to establish whether estimates are specic
to the created situation or are informative for social interactions in the real world. Estimates of peer
e¤ects in naturally occurring peer groups are therefore potentially more convincing. Kremer & Miguel
(2007), for example, analyze peer e¤ects in the usage of deworming drugs in Kenya using information on
household social links; Rao et al. (2007) estimate peer e¤ects in vaccination decisions among students
using Facebook to derive information on their social network; and Oster & Thornton (2012) look at the
role of social interactions in the usage of menstrual cups in Nepal in a school environment.7
We follow the promising approach of analyzing social interactions in real world peer groups. We exploit
random variation in the eligibility status of individuals and treatment status of localities in PROGRESA
as identifying elements in a partial-population setting. As will be discussed below, treatment and control
villages are randomly chosen and eligibility status is exogenously determined by the government. This
random variation is unrelated to other elements that determine participation and allow us to deal with
Mankis identication issues. Methodologically, our approach follows the framework proposed by Lalive
& Cattaneo (2009) and Bobonis & Finan (2009), who analyze the role of peer e¤ects in school enrollment
using PROGRESA data. An individual di¤erence in di¤erence approach is used in which behavioral
changes related to the implementation of PROGRESA are analyzed. The di¤erence in di¤erence approach
7For an overview of research on social interactions in di¤erent economic research elds, see e.g. Dahl et al. (2012).
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makes it possible to control for general trends and time invariant heterogeneity. Avitabile (2011) and
Barzallo (2011) have done analyses that look at indirect treatment e¤ects of PROGRESA on health care
utilization and health.8 They nd positive spillover e¤ects for participation in cervical cancer screening
(Avitabile, 2011) and medical check-ups, and for child and adult health (Barzallo, 2011), while no indirect
e¤ect is found for blood pressure and blood sugar tests (Avitabile, 2011). Our approach surpasses their
analyses, since we disentangle the indirect treatment e¤ect in contextual, correlated and endogenous
social interactions. In addition to the identication of endogenous social interactions, we also assess
the relative importance of social interaction e¤ects compared to direct nancial incentives in changing
preventive care participation.
Evidence of the role of social interactions on participation in or usage of preventive care is mixed. Most
papers nd positive peer e¤ects (e.g. Aizer & Currie, 2004; Deri, 2005; Godlonton & Thornton, 2012;
Oster & Thornton, 2012; Munshi & Myaux, 2006; Rao et al., 2007), others nd no e¤ect (e.g. Meredith et
al., 2013), and even negative e¤ects are found (e.g. Kremer & Miguel, 2007). The divergence in the results
can be explained by the relative importance of the di¤erent channels through which social interactions
play. Our results indicate that PROGRESA was successful in increasing preventive care usage both
among eligible and non-eligible households in treatment villages relative to households in control villages.
We were able to isolate endogenous social interactions and showed that signicant positive interaction
e¤ects are present for deworming drugs usage, cervical cancer screening, blood pressure tests, and child
growth and weight monitoring. The magnitude of the peer e¤ects is, however, di¤erent depending on the
type of preventive care. Social interaction e¤ects are especially high for participation in annual growth
and weight monitoring of children.9 Using the information on social interactions, the total treatment
e¤ect can be decomposed in a direct e¤ect, related to the nancial incentive given to eligible households
for complying with PROGRESA requirements, and an indirect social interaction e¤ect. The indirect
e¤ect accounts for 10% up to 58% of the total treatment e¤ect for the eligibles, a non-negligible element
in explaining the change in preventive health behavior.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion of prevention
in Mexico, the PROGRESA program, and the data used in the analysis. We lay out our research question
in section 3 and provide descriptive evidence. In section 4, we discuss our research design and identication
strategy. The main results are presented in section 5, followed by a robustness analysis and a conclusion
8With indirect treatment e¤ects, we mean behavioural changes of the non-eligible population in treatment villages.
9Annual participation in growth and weight monitoring was already high before PROGRESA was introduced and was
further increased among the eligibles through the nancial incentives. It is possible that non-participation became socially
disapproved and the desire to conform higher than for other types of preventive care.
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Table 1: OECD data (year 1997) on health indicators from Mexico, Chile and the US
Mexico Chile US
Doctor consultations per capita 2.3 8.2 3.7
Cervical cancer screening rate (% of females aged 20-69 screened) (data from 2000) 9.7% 64.5% 
Cervical cancer mortality (deaths per 100.000 females, age standardized) 20.4 15 3.5
Diabetes mortality (deaths per 100.000 individuals, age standardized) 103 30.7 27.7
Circulatory disease mortality (deaths per 100.000 individuals,age standardized) 341.6 322.4 424.7
Infectious disease mortality (deaths per 100.000 individuals, age standardized) 34.3 30 21.5
Neonatal mortality (deaths per 1000 live births) 14 5.7 4.8
Infant mortality (deaths per 1000 live births) 23.8 10 7.2
Low birthweight infants (% of live births) 9.2% 4.8% 7.5%
Immunization rate: measles (% of children immunised) 91.0% 96.0% 91.0%
Note: Unless otherwise stated, the presented data is OECD Health data from 1997.
in sections 6 and 7.
2 PROGRESA program and evaluation data
2.1 Prevention in Mexico
In this paper, we look at the use of deworming drugs, participation of females in cervical cancer screening,
take-up of blood sugar and blood pressure tests by adults, the weight and growth monitoring of children,
and child immunization. Sánchez-Castillo et al. (2004) state that traditionally, Mexicos health concerns
have been childhood malnutrition and infectious diseases, although the latter has been overtaken by
cardiovascular diseases, cancers, and diabetes as the principal causes of death. The health care indicators
chosen in this paper are at the core of the challenges faced by the Mexican health care system in 1997.
In the late nineties, we can state that except for immunization Mexico was underperforming in
di¤erent main aspects of health care. Table 1 provides a comparison of some key indicators with respect
to the chosen health variables based on OECD and WHO data. Mexico is compared to two OECD
countries, its neighboring country, the US, and Chile, which has a similar GDP per capita. Rather than
providing a detailed overview of the Mexican health care system in comparison to other countries, the
purpose of the provided information is to show that Mexico in 1997 underperformed with respect to the
health variables chosen in this paper and that action was needed.
Cervical cancer was the rst cause of death due to neoplasms among Mexican women (Agurto et al.,
2004). In fact, mortality rates were among the highest in the Americas (Lewis, 2004). Even though
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a screening program existed since 197410 , and cervical cancer is fully treatable when discovered early,
cancer screening among Mexican females was very low with, in the year 2000, a participation rate of
10% among females aged 20 to 69 compared to 65% in Chile. Cited reasons for non-participation were
low quality of screening, a perceived breach of privacy when the pap smear is taken by male doctors, a
lack of knowledge, a preference for ignorance since cancer is perceived as deadly, and seeking of medical
assistance when the cancer has already entered its late stages rather than screening when feeling healthy
(Agurto et al., 2004; Watkins et al., 2002).
The death burden caused by diabetes 103 deaths per 100.000 individuals in 1997 was very high
and over three times as large in Mexico than in Chile or the US. Together with hypertension, diabetes
increases the risk for heart failure. The prevalence of hypertension was 33.3% in men and 25.6% in women
(Sánchez-Castillo et al., 2004). In 1997, diseases of the circulatory system were as common in Mexico as
in Chile, and 25% less common than in the US.
Infectious and parasitic diseases accounted for 34 deaths per 100.000 individuals (age standardized
rates) in 1997 and the death rate was 10% higher than in Chile and 50% higher than in the US.
Neonatal and infant mortality were double as high in Mexico in 1997 as in Chile and three times as
high as in the US. Moreover, the percentage of children born with low birthweight was 9% in Mexico, or
twice as high as in Chile. WHO gures, with respect to height and weight proles of Mexican children
under 5 years, indicate that they were on average smaller and weighed less than children in the US and
in Chile. Nonetheless, important improvements have been made with respect to child mortality in the
period 1980-1997 with a halving of the mortality rate among children under 5 years old (Sepúlveda et
al., 2006). Moreover, anaemia and micronutrient deciencies were highly prevalent in Mexico. These
conditions can be improved by providing iron and zinc supplements, among others (Sepúlveda et al.,
2006).
Finally, vaccination rates among children were high, over 90% and comparable to those in the US and
Chile. After a deadly measles epidemic in 1989-1990, the Mexican government established the successful
Mexican universal vaccination program in 1991 (Barham, 2005; Sepúlveda et al., 2006). By October
1992, coverage rates for tuberculosis and measles were 95% and 91%, respectively.
10The national cervical cancer screening program in Mexico o¤ers free screening regardless of age and income and tries
to raise awareness among women aged 25 and over.
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2.2 Program background
In 1997, the Mexican government initiated a large-scale social program aimed at complementing the
income of marginalized households in the poorest rural communities and fostering human capital ac-
cumulation among children. Monetary transfers were handed out as of 1998 and are conditional on
compliance of behavior in two distinct components: educationand nutrition and health.
The educational channel consists of bimonthly grants for children aged less than 17 years that regularly
attend grades 3 to 9. Program transfers do not cover all costs, they are di¤erentiated according to grade
and gender11 and are capped at a maximum of three enrolled children.
In exchange for cash transfer and nutritional supplements, PROGRESAs health and nutrition com-
ponent requires regular free medical check-ups, growth and weight monitoring and vaccination of young
children and perinatal care for pregnant women. Other family members have to visit a local health center
at least yearly for a free check-up and preventive care. Program beneciaries are also required to partic-
ipate in pláticas, i.e. informational meetings where issues on health, hygiene and nutrition are discussed.
It is possible to participate in the health and nutrition component without claiming educational grants,
but not vice versa (Bobba, 2012).
PROGRESA is a targeted program. Beneciaries were identied in two steps (see INSP, 2005). First,
highly marginalized rural villages with between 50 and 2.500 inhabitants were selected for sequential
entry into the PROGRESA program using a deprivation index. The villages needed to have access to
schooling and health care. Next, within the selected villages, poor families were identied. A poverty
index score was attributed to all households based on an assessment of their permanent income and
household composition. Households with an index score below a certain region-specic threshold were
considered poor and could qualify for PROGRESA transfers. Eligibility status and the corresponding
rights and benets were clearly communicated through village-wide assembly meetings. Eligibility status
(and non-eligibility status) was awarded for three years and only eligible families that lived in villages
where PROGRESA was implemented became potential program beneciaries. In 1998, PROGRESA was
available in 34.400 localities (1.6 million households), and coverage reached as many as 48.700 localities
(2.3 million households) in 1999 and 67.500 localities (3.1 million households) in 2001.
An important feature of PROGRESA is that it included an evaluation component. The evaluation
11Grants increase as children reach higher grades and they are higher for girls than for boys. The latter is to enhance the
educational level of girls, which is below that of boys.
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design allows the analysis of PROGRESA as a partial-population intervention12 that is phased in at
random. For the evaluation, a subset of 506 localities were selected from across seven states clustered
around Mexico city. In October 1997, an initial survey collected socioeconomic information to determine
eligibility status of households in all 506 localities.13 On average, 52% of the households were eligible
for PROGRESA, but the percentages vary substantially across localities. Finally, a set of 320 localities
were randomly selected as treatment group where PROGRESA was implemented as of April 1998. The
remaining 186 communities acted as a control group and were phased in at the start of 2000. The
randomization of treatment and control groups has the advantage that it should ensure that both groups
are balanced in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics. Using appropriate techniques,
the e¤ects of PROGRESA can therefore be reliably identied. Behrman & Todd (1999), as well as
many authors that used PROGRESA data in the past, have checked whether pre-program behavior and
observable background characteristics are similar in control and treatment groups. They conclude that
the randomization procedure worked e¤ectively.
The PROGRESA interventions are designed to improve health and development from the very start
of life. In a rst step, PROGRESA aims to decrease the number of low birth weight babies. Low birth
weight babies are more susceptible to deciencies and diseases and run a higher risk of neonatal and
infant mortality (Currie, 2009; Gertler, 2000). As discussed in the previous subsection, low birth weight,
neonatal and infant mortality are more common problems in Mexico than they are in e.g. Chile or the
US. While some low birth weight babies are able to catch up with their contemporaries, most of them
tend to su¤er a development disadvantage throughout childhood with potential consequences on future
opportunities (Gertler, 2000). PROGRESA imposes pregnant women to have at least 5 prenatal care
visits and o¤ers nutritional supplements when needed.
In a second step, young children as well as their lactating mothers are required to attend medical
check-ups for growth and weight monitoring and immunization. Children below 24 months are required
to attend a check-up at least every two months, while children between 24 and 60 months have an ap-
pointment scheduled every four months (Gertler, 2004). Children who lag behind in physical development
or are found to be malnourished receive protein and micronutrient supplement, either directly or via their
12A partial-population intervention refers to a design with treated and non-treated (control) clusters. Within the treated
clusters only a subset of units are o¤ered the treatment (Baird et al., 2012; Mo¢ tt, 2001).
13By July 1999, PROGRESA reclassied a large number of non-eligible households as eligible for the program benets
after complaints that the initial procedure discriminated against the elderly poor who no longer live with their children.
The revised households (26% of the evaluation sample) are called the densicado group. However, by August 2000, PRO-
GRESA sta¤ found that many of the newly admitted households had not collected any benet. Apparently, few densicado
households had been notied of their revised eligibility status for the program (Buddelmeyer and Skouas, 2004). Given
that we limit our analyses to the rst year of the program (March 1998 to March 1999), we consider these households as
non-eligible.
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lactating mother. From the pioneering work of Robert W. Fogel, we know that there is a robust rela-
tionship between height and economic well-being, and economists have found, for example, that adult
height is related to earnings (Currie, 2009). Nutrition and development during childhood is likely to play
an important role in this relation. Case & Paxson (2006) argue that poor nutrition during childhood
likely a¤ects both future cognitive performance and adult height, explaining the observed correlation.
The obligation of growth and weight monitoring for infants combined with the distribution of nutritional
supplements potentially has a high pay-o¤ in terms of future human capital accumulation. Immunization
policies aim to avoid the occurrence of serious and/or contagious diseases, such as the measles, mumps,
tetanus, polio, hepatitis A and B, etc. The Mexican government has a vaccination scheme for children
that determines which vaccinations are required at what age; the details of which are elaborated in o¢ cial
norms.14
In a third step, attention is paid to the health of adolescents and adults. In order to receive transfers,
every family member has to attend a yearly medical check-up. Special attention is paid to reproductive
health, family planning, the detection and (preventive) treatment of parasites, of arterial hypertension, of
diabetes mellitus, and of cervical cancer (Gertler, 2000). The dangers of these disorders, and the benets
of early detection and treatment, are discussed as well as health and hygiene habits. Participation in
cervical cancer screening (pap smear test), usage of deworming drugs, and take-up of blood sugar and
blood pressure tests are not obligatory in order to receive PROGRESA transfers, but are encouraged in
the obligatory pláticas and medical check-ups.
2.3 Data and sample selection
In the evaluation sample, extensive surveys have been carried out to document the e¤ects of PROGRESA.
There are two baseline surveys (October 1997 and March 1998) and three post-program surveys (October
1998, March 1999 and November 1999) on all 24.000 households in the 506 localities. At the start of
2000, the control group was phased in into the program and additional surveys were conducted. In our
analysis, we primarily use the two baseline surveys and the rst two post-program surveys.
Each survey contains detailed information on household demographics, socioeconomic status, educa-
tion, income, expenditures, consumption and health. Not every survey asks the same questions. Questions
on the use of health care services and usage are asked in March 1998, October 1998 and March 1999,
while many pre-program background characteristics are observed in October 1997. Next to household
14Examples of such norms around the time PROGRESA was implemented are the Norma ocial Mexicana 031-SSA2-
1999 on childrens health or the Norma ocial Mexicana 036-SSA2-2002 which brings together prevailing norms and rules
on prevention, vaccination, toxic substances etc.
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or individual specic information, there are also locality surveys with information on local prices, wages
and health service availability.
Individual level data is available for growth and weight monitoring of children below the age of 5.
Prior to program initiation (March 1998 survey), it was asked whether a child had attended a growth
and weight check-up in the past year and if so, how many times. After PROGRESA had started in the
treatment villages, the same questions were asked, but for the past six months (October 1998 and March
1999 survey). Two participation variables are constructed: one variable that indicates whether a child
had attended at least one check-up in the past year (evaluated in March 1998 and March 1999), and
another variable that indicates whether a child had attended the required number of growth and weight
check-ups as imposed by PROGRESA, evaluated for the past year in March 1998 and for the past six
months in March 1999. For the latter participation variable, we choose to focus on the post-program
period October 1998 to March 1999, rather than the period April 1998 to March 1999, since PROGRESA
was only introduced in April 1998 and it is likely that a switch in monitoring frequency takes at least
some transition time.
With respect to vaccination, data are available on vaccination of measles, tuberculosis, tetanus and
polio. In March 1998 and October 1998, vaccination history is recorded for children below the age of 5,
while in March 1999, the information is available only for children below the age of 2. We will focus on
take-up of the vaccinations of tuberculosis and measles, since these are infrequent and therefore easily
observed. There is one shot at birth for tuberculosis and one shot before age 1 for measles with a renewal
around age 6. For tetanus and polio, there are at least four shots before the age of 5 and the data is
not recorded accurately enough to follow the vaccination history unambiguously (Barham, 2005). When
possible, we evaluate vaccination status in March 1999 and compare it with vaccination status in March
1998, however, for older children who are unobserved in March 1999, we derive post-program vaccination
from the October 1998 survey.
For the usage of deworming drugs and the check-ups for blood sugar and blood pressure, we have
household level data on whether someone in the household has taken these drugs or tests in the past year
(March 1998 survey) or in the past six months (October 1998 and March 1999 survey). In the latter case,
a yearly equivalent take-up variable is generated in order to analyze changes in yearly participation before
and after program implementation. With respect to cervical cancer screening, the data are also at the
household level, but more information is available. In March 1998, participants were asked if someone in
the household had ever participated in screening and if so, in which year. After program implementation,
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participants were asked whether someone in the household took a screening test in the last six months.
In 1997, the o¢ cial Mexican norm for cervical cancer screening prescribed a test every three years (after
normal test results for two consecutive years).15 We create a variable that checks compliance with this
norm both before (evaluated in March 1998) and after the implementation of PROGRESA (evaluated in
March 1999) and analyze the changes in compliance.
3 Research question and descriptive evidence
The basic idea of this paper is that social interactions might play a role in the decision to participate
or use preventive care. We assume that the social interactions occur at the locality level, since we lack
information on the actual social network of an individual. Thus, the peer group of a child or a household
are all other sampled children16 or households in the locality. This choice is justiable, since rural localities
are quite small, with 47 households per village on average. Moreover, Adato (2000, p. vi) documents "a
common identity in poverty" within the localities. Despite the division created by PROGRESA, there
is a perception that everyone is poor, and that "beneciaries and non-beneciaries continue to get along
with each other ne and the sameas before" (Adato, 2000, p. vi). This suggest that social relationships
go beyond program eligibility status.
Tables 10 to 16 in appendix 1 present descriptive statistics on individual and household characteristics
of the entire sample as well as the subsamples used in our empirical analyses. A distinction is made
between eligibles and non-eligibles in control and treatment villages. In Table 10, we observe that literacy
of the household heads and their partners in the rural villages is around 65% to 70% and is somewhat
higher among the non-poor than the poor. A similar fraction has at least started primary school, but
only a minor group has moved on to secondary school or beyond (5% among the poor and 8% among the
non-poor). Among the group of non-eligible households, household heads and their partner in control
villages are more likely to have started primary education and be able to read and write. Among the
group of poor households, the partners of the household heads in control villages are more likely to have
started secondary education. Aside from an educational imbalance in favor of control villages, di¤erences
between control and treatment villages are minor or non-existent, as one would expect from the random
assignment of villages. Among the poor, we nd a statistically signicant di¤erence in civil status. In
treatment villages, couples tend to be married more frequently than in control villages, whereas in control
15The recommended screening frequency is laid down by the o¢ cial Mexican screening norm NOM-014-SSA2-1994 and
its modications.
16We exclude other children living in the same household from the reference group of a child.
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villages couples are more likely to live together outside marriage. Considering couples irrespective of mode
of cohabitation, the di¤erences cancel out.
A major di¤erence between poor and non-poor households can be observed in the marginality index
(the criterion for the distinction between both) and other wealth variables. The non-poor have better
dwellings (more likely with a cement oor and rm roof) in which they live with fewer household members.
They are also more likely to have a car and agricultural assets. Their schooling is better and they are
less likely to be from indigenous origin. Finally, the non-poor household heads are more likely female,
and they and their partners are on average older than their poor counterparts.
Since we limit our sample to households with pre- and post-baseline answers, there is a risk of sample
selection and attrition. If we look at the subsamples in Tables 11 to 14, we observe, in general, similar
trends as for the entire sample. The subsamples are, however, better educated, more literate and they have
younger and fewer female household heads both for eligibles and non-eligibles in control and treatment
villages. The educational and literacy imbalance in favor of control villages remains in the subsamples as
well as the di¤erence in mode of cohabitation among the eligibles. In addition, inhabitants of treatment
villages are more likely to have tile roofs. The deviations from the complete sample are limited, which
gives us condence that our estimation results are applicable to the population.
The subsamples for growth and weight monitoring and vaccination, i.e. Tables 15 and 16, contain
younger and better educated households than the entire sample. As could be expected, the households
in this subsample consist of more couples and have more household members. The di¤erences between
control and treatment villages show the same trend as those for the entire sample.
Table 2 provides descriptive evidence on the e¤ect of PROGRESA on di¤erent types of preventive
care. Pre- and post program values are reported both for eligibles and non-eligibles averaged over control
and treatment villages. Households in control villages give information on the counterfactual situation
without PROGRESA, under the assumptions that randomization at village level was successful and that
control villages are not indirectly a¤ected by the program. Several conclusions can be drawn from Table
2.
First, pre-program di¤erences between control and treatment villages exist, but are very small and,
in general, statistically not signicant. One exception is growth and weight monitoring of children at
a yearly frequency in non-eligible households. Participation in monitoring was 5% higher in control
villages before PROGRESA was implemented. The lack of signicant di¤erences is again an indication
of successful randomization.
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Table 2: Descriptive evidence on the e¤ect of PROGRESA on participation in prevention
Eligible Non-eligible
Program Control Di¤erence (SD) Program Control Di¤erence (SD)
Deworming drugs usage
Drugs usage pre-program 0.511 0.507 0.003 (0.022) 0.439 0.463 -0.024 (0.017)
Drugs usage post-program 0.831 0.719 0.113 (0.018)*** 0.636 0.633 0.003 (0.016)
Change in drugs usage 0.321 0.211 0.109 (0.018)*** 0.197 0.170 0.027 (0.017)y
Observations 6616 3808 5280 3463
Cervical cancer screening
In accordance with screening norm pre-program 0.220 0.247 -0.028 (0.021) 0.270 0.283 -0.014 (0.019)
In accordance with screening norm post-program 0.641 0.474 0.167 (0.026)*** 0.542 0.526 0.016 (0.021)
Change in accordance screening norm 0.422 0.227 0.195 (0.019)*** 0.272 0.242 0.030 (0.016)*
Observations 6403 3676 5001 3331
Blood sugar test
Blood sugar test pre-program 0.232 0.220 0.013 (0.020) 0.314 0.315 0.000 (0.020)
Blood sugar test post-program 0.642 0.420 0.222 (0.024)*** 0.539 0.522 0.017 (0.021)
Change in blood sugar test participation 0.409 0.200 0.209 (0.023)*** 0.225 0.208 0.017 (0.018)
Observations 6441 3685 5198 3386
Blood pressure test
Blood pressure test pre-program 0.355 0.339 0.016 (0.023) 0.459 0.469 -0.010 (0.022)
Blood pressure test post-program 0.769 0.539 0.230 (0.024)*** 0.675 0.646 0.029 (0.020)y
Change in blood pressure test participation 0.414 0.200 0.214 (0.022)*** 0.216 0.177 0.039 (0.019)**
Observations 6530 3717 5297 3446
Growth and weight monitoring (yearly)
Monitoring (at least yearly) pre-program 0.811 0.831 -0.021 (0.024) 0.824 0.873 -0.049 (0.023)**
Monitoring (at least yearly) post-program 0.988 0.946 0.042 (0.010)*** 0.962 0.965 -0.003 (0.010)
Change in monitoring (at least yearly) 0.177 0.115 0.062 (0.021)*** 0.138 0.093 0.046 (0.020)**
Observations 6518 3773 2148 1554
Growth and weight monitoring (PROGRESA frequency)
Monitoring (PROGRESA frequency) pre-program 0.244 0.254 -0.009 (0.010) 0.261 0.263 -0.002 (0.017)
Monitoring (PROGRESA frequency) post-program 0.788 0.674 0.113 (0.010)*** 0.659 0.629 0.030 (0.018)*
Change in monitoring (PROGRESA frequency) 0.544 0.421 0.123 (0.014)*** 0.398 0.366 0.032 (0.024)
Observations 5194 3056 1651 1208
Compliance with vaccination scheme
Vaccination compliance pre-program 0.925 0.929 -0.004 (0.008) 0.927 0.931 -0.004 (0.010)
Vaccination compliance post-program 0.989 0.991 -0.002 (0.002) 0.985 0.987 -0.002 (0.004)
Change in vaccination compliance 0.064 0.062 0.002 (0.008) 0.058 0.056 0.002 (0.010)
Observations 7088 4187 2451 1661
Note: Mean pre-program values are reported as measured in March 1998. Mean post-program values are reported as measured in October 1998 and/or March 1999.
Di¤erences are estimated using OLS regression with robust standard errors that allow for correlation of disturbance terms within localities. Signicance levels
of di¤erences: y p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
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Second, the pre-program participation rates for blood sugar test, blood pressure test, and cervical
cancer screening are systematically higher among non-eligibles than among eligibles. For the use of
deworming drugs, the opposite is true. For prevention among children, pre-program participation rates
are comparable among eligibles and non-eligibles.
Third, the changes in preventive behavior between pre- and post-program levels suggest an increasing
participation pattern in preventive care. The trend is especially pronounced for the types of preventive
care aimed at adolescents and adults and for monitoring at PROGRESA frequency. The fraction of
households that is in accordance with the screening norm or took a blood sugar test almost tripled in
one year among eligible households in treatment villages, going from 22% to 64%, and it almost doubled
in the remainder of the population. Similar e¤ects are observed for child weight and growth monitoring
at PROGRESA frequency. There are also substantial increases in preventive behavior for deworming
drugs usage and blood pressure tests. Participation, or usage, increased by 60% to 120% for eligibles in
treatment villages and between 40% and 60% in other parts of the population. Annual growth monitoring
and child vaccination have high pre-program participation rates, over 80% and over 90%, respectively.
Hence, the change in behavior is much less pronounced. After program implementation, full participation
is almost attained. The increase is fairly equal for vaccination, while for growth monitoring, the change
in participation is more pronounced in treatment villages.
Fourth, in the post-program period, we observe that di¤erences between treatment and control villages
turn positive and signicant for eligibles, except for child vaccination. Also, di¤erences in pre-post changes
of preventive behavior show signicance for the eligibles. This is a rst indication of the total treatment
e¤ects of PROGRESA on the beneciary population and suggests a positive contribution of PROGRESA
to health prevention. We can infer from Table 2, for example, that the program increased compliance with
the cervical cancer screening norm by 19,5 percentage points more among eligibles and by 21 percentage
points for blood sugar and blood pressure tests. The program e¤ects implied by the di¤erence in pre-
post changes between control and treatment villages are made even more explicit in Table 3. Panel A.1
reproduces the ndings of Table 2 for eligibles and panel B.1 for non-eligibles. Panels A.2 and B.2 show
that the magnitude of the PROGRESA e¤ects are smaller once individual and household characteristics
are controlled for. Signicance remains high for eligibles, but decreases for non-eligibles due to the smaller
e¤ects.
Fifth, the pre-post changes of preventive behavior among the non-eligibles are indicators for the
indirect spillover e¤ects. A much smaller di¤erence in changes in preventive behavior is observed between
non-eligibles in control and treatment villages. With respect to cervical cancer screening for example,
15
the di¤erence in the increase in compliance was 19,5 percentage points among eligibles in treatment
and control villages, whereas it is only 3 percentage points among non-eligibles. The di¤erences remain,
however, signicant for deworming drugs usage, cervical cancer screening, blood pressure tests and annual
child monitoring. This suggests the existence of indirect spillover e¤ects and potentially of endogenous
social interaction. The e¤ects are small and non-signicant for monitoring at PROGRESA frequency and
vaccination. This implies weak or no spillover e¤ects. In the next section, we discuss our identication
strategy in order to more exactly measure the social interaction e¤ects.
Finally, a high participation rate is recorded for annual growth and weight monitoring of young
children. After program implementation, it becomes almost universal. However, compliance with the
frequency of visits imposed by PROGRESA is not common practice before program implementation. In
March 1998, only a fth of all children were monitored according to PROGRESA requirements in the
past year. This, however, drastically increased in the year following implementation and in the period
October 1998 to March 1999, compliance according to PROGRESA requirements increased to 80% among
eligibles in treatment localities and around 65% for the other groups.
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4 Research design and identication strategy
We use a linear-in-means model to estimate social interactions. Variations of a general linear-in-means
model are popular specications that are used frequently in empirical work on social interaction e¤ects
in crime, schooling, fertility, labor market decisions, participation in welfare programs, etc. The linear-
in-means specication can be derived as the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a complete information
game in which each individuals expected utility consists in a private benet and a conformity benet
(Blume et al., 2010).17 This means that social interactions in this setting stem from conformity behavior.
It captures both informational conformity and pure conformity elements. For our purpose, the models
foundations seems to t our analysis since informational and pure conformity are valid choices as drivers
of social interactions when analyzing changes in usage and participation in prevention. For immunization
decisions, other strategic social behavior is possible, since, for contagious diseases, individuals could free
ride on the preventive e¤ort of others. However, since vaccination participation rates were high even
before PROGRESA was initiated, it is more likely that conformity with prevailing social practice will
dominate the social interaction e¤ects.
4.1 Linear-in-means model
Let Higv denote the change18 in preventive care participation and usage between March 1998 and March
1999 of child/family i in peer group g in locality v. Since we do not have better information on the social
connections of individuals or households within a locality, we assume that g and v coincide.19 Therefore,
we drop the subscript v. A value Pig = 1 indicates that the family is eligible for PROGRESA, while
Pig = 0 corresponds to non-eligibility status. An indicator variable T indicates the treatment status of a
locality. A value T = 1 denotes a PROGRESA treatment village, while control villages have an indicator
value T = 0.
Equation (1) looks at the e¤ect of PROGRESA on changes in preventive behavior.
Hig = 0 + 1T + ig (1)
The randomized implementation of PROGRESA implies E(igjT ) = 0 when estimating eq. (1) in the
17The benets are specied using a quadratic function, which is not unusual when modelling conformity (Akerlof, 1997).
Two other assumptions in the model are that the size of the peer group is nite and group membership is exogenous.
18Our analysis focuses on changes in behaviour rather than the actual behaviour at a moment in time. This di¤erence-
in-di¤erence approach allows us to control for time-invariant (un)observed individual, village-level and other heterogeneity.
19The use of village-wide peer groups has the disadvantage that village-specic shocks to the studied beliefs and behaviour
cannot be controlled for. Some papers infer family connections using information on surnames, see e.g. Angelucci et al.
(2010). This information is however not publically available.
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eligible and non-eligible subsamples. Table 3 shows the results of the regression in both subsamples. The
total e¤ect of the PROGRESA program is captured by the parameter value E1 if eq. (1) is estimated
among the eligibles (superscript E).20 This includes both a direct e¤ect as a result of the cash transfers
and subsequent change in behavior and a feedback e¤ect due to social interactions. At this stage, it
is not possible to disentangle both e¤ects. As noted above, this e¤ect is signicant and positive for all
preventive care variables, except child immunization. If the subgroup of non-eligibles (superscript NE)
is considered, NE1 gives an estimate of the indirect treatment e¤ect of PROGRESA that spilled over
from the eligibles to the non-eligibles.21 Table 3 shows that these e¤ects are in general smaller and less
signicant. Social interaction e¤ects are part of the spillover e¤ects.
In order to estimate social interactions, we use the following specication of the linear-in-means model:
Hig = + Xig + Xg + Pig + Pg + Hg + Sg + "ig (2)
where Xig are exogenous characteristics of the individual (that are not time invariant) and Xg; Pg and
Hg are the peer group - excluding individual i - averaged counterparts of Xig; Pig and Hig, respectively.
Changes in the shared environment of peer group g are captured by Sg. Identifying social interactions
based on equation (2) is challenging, if not impossible.
First of all, group-level e¤ects on preventive behavior can be di¤erent in nature. There are correlated
e¤ects, which means that individuals in the same peer group tend to behave similarly simply because they
have similar individual characteristics or face similar economic/institutional/natural environments. In
our approach, they are captured by parameter ,  and the di¤erence in di¤erence approach. Contextual
peer e¤ects arise when exogenous group characteristics inuence individual behavior. This is represented
in eq. (2) by  and also captured by the di¤erence in di¤erence specication. Parameter  measures
endogenous peer e¤ects, which means that individual behavioral changes relate to changes in behavior of
others in the peer group. This is the parameter of interest if we want to determine the presence of social
interactions.
Secondly, while researchers are especially interested in the endogenous social interactions, Manski
(1993) showed that the di¤erent e¤ects cannot be separately identied in the typical linear-in-means
model as in eq. (2), due to self-selection into similar groups and simultaneity of individual behavior.
However, the specic design of PROGRESAs evaluation component allows us to address these two
identication problems under fairly weak assumptions. The fact that individuals tend to self-select
20This is sometimes denoted the average treatment e¤ect of the treated (ATT).
21This is sometimes denoted the average treatment e¤ect of the non-treated (ATNT) or indirect treatment e¤ect (ITE).
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into similar groups is an omitted variable problem (Lalive and Cattaneo, 2009). Randomization of the
PROGRESA treatment implies that whether or not a household resides in a treatment or control village
is independent from unobservables that might a¤ect our dependent variables, thereby addressing the
omitted variable problem. The simultaneity of individual behavior relates to the fact that each member
in a social group a¤ects every other member. Behavioral changes are jointly observed, and it is unclear
who a¤ected who. Mo¢ tt (2001) showed that this problem can be overcome in a partial-population
setting, whereby the outcome of a randomly chosen subgroup is exogenously altered by some treatment.
This is exactly what happens in PROGRESA. PROGRESA has a treatment selection at the locality
level (random division between control and treatment villages) and a poverty eligibility threshold at the
household level. As shown below, identication relies on the fact that an exogenously determined subset
of households within a treated village remains untreated, and on the crucial assumption that non-eligibles
in control villages provide a valid counterfactual. We have shown evidence of the successful randomization
in the evaluation component of PROGRESA. We can rewrite equation (2) with an additional treatment
variable for eligibles in treated villages (PigT ):
Hig = + Xig + Xg + Pig + Pg + Hg + Sg + PigT + "ig (3)
The direct e¤ect of the program is now captured by , while the peer group e¤ect is identied by 
times the change in average peer group preventive behavior. Beneciaries in treated villages are inuenced
by both, while non-eligibles are not subject to the direct e¤ect. If we look at the subgroups of eligibles
and non-eligibles, the equations are:
HEig = + Xig + Xg + + Pg + Hg + Sg + T + "ig (3)
HNEig = + Xig + Xg + Pg + Hg + Sg + "ig (3)
The peer group averaged outcome can be decomposed in the underlying subgroup averages:
Hg = PgH
E
g + (1  Pg)HNEg (4)
Taking the expectations of eqs. (3) and (3) and inserting them in eq. (4), gives the following
20
expression:
Hg =

1   +
 + 
1   Xg +
+ 
1   Pg +

1   Sg +

1   PgT (5)
Equation (5) does not allow us to directly estimate , but it suggests an identication strategy. Since
PgT is not included in eq. (3), inserting eq. (5) in eq. (3) provides an identication method:
HNEig =

1   + Xig +
 + 
1   Xg +
+ 
1   Pg +

1   Sg + 

1   PgT + "ig (6)
Exploiting the treatment e¤ect in PROGRESAs partial-population design results in two reduced-
form equations, eqs. (5) and (6). The endogenous social interactions, represented by , can be identied
as the ratio of the treatment e¤ect of PROGRESA on HNEig to the treatment e¤ect of PROGRESA
on Hg. More specically, the two reduced-form equations can be estimated with the "eligible share in
PROGRESA treatment villages" as an instrument for changes in average preventive behavior in the peer
group of non-eligible families.22
The IV identication strategy relies on the fact that the "eligible share in PROGRESA treatment
villages" is correlated with average peer group outcomes and uncorrelated with the error term in eq.
(6). The correlation between the instrument and changes in peer group outcomes can be estimated (see
Table 4), the lack of correlation with the error term is, however, not directly testable. We can provide
evidence to support this assumption. The random assignment of localities to the control and treatment
group is a rst indication (see above). Secondly, we can estimate the correlation between our dependent
variables and the PROGRESA locality treatment status before the program was introduced. The results
are shown above in Table 2 and indicate no signicant di¤erence in the pre-program values of the di¤erent
types of prevention, except for a di¤erence of 5 percentage points in participation rates for annual growth
monitoring between non-eligible children in control and treatment villages. Thirdly, the IV strategy is
based on the idea that changes in preventive behavior among non-eligibles in treatment villages result
from the PROGRESA induced changes in preventive behavior among the eligibles within the locality.
They do not come from changes in contextual variables and non-eligibles are not a¤ected through other
channels. We condition our estimations on a large number of peer group contextual variables and as a
robustness check (see Sections 6 and 7), we introduce a variety of features that might a¤ect individual
22Bobonis and Finan (2009) use PROGRESA treatment as instrument (T ), rather than the interaction of PROGRESA
treatment and the fraction of eligibles (PgT ). They do this, because the share of eligibles in a village may not be exogenous
if there is any sorting of families in and out of the village based on unobservable characteristics of the households or
villages. However, since villages are randomly assigned to treatment status and eligibility is xed for three years, we keep
the theoretically proposed instrument, the method also chosen by Lalive and Cattaneo (2009). Our results however do not
quantitatively change when using T as an instrument, but the precision of the estimates decreases. Adding T as a second
instrument, does not lead to di¤erent or more precisely estimated coe¢ cients.
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preventive behavior, e.g. geographic variation, changes in waiting time, supply, and quality of health care
facilities that might explain changes in the take-up of prevention.
4.2 Direct versus indirect e¤ect
We have now identied the endogenous social interaction e¤ect . As can be seen in eqs. (5) and (6), the
social interaction e¤ect gives leverage to changes in average group characteristics. The leverage factor
(1  ) 1 is called the social multiplier.
From a policy point of view, we are not only interested in the presence and magnitude of endogenous
social interaction e¤ects, we are equally interested in the program e¤ects on individual behavior. In the
end, we want estimates for the direct e¤ect, , and the indirect e¤ect, i.e.  times the change in peer
group preventive care usage. This would allow us to decompose the total program e¤ect in its constituting
parts for eligibles in treated villages. In the previous subsection, the identication of  was discussed.
The change in peer group preventive behavior can be measured, therefore the remaining challenge is
to identify . As shown by Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) it is possible to identify the direct e¤ect by
subtracting changes in peer group average preventive behavior Hg from changes in individual values Hig.
Hig  Hg = (Xig  Xg) + (Pig   Pg) + T (Pig   Pg) + "ig (7)
How should we think about the di¤erent e¤ects? Consider a treated village with one beneciary
household and many non-eligible households. The beneciary household will get a direct e¤ect of , but
no indirect e¤ect, since no other households are a¤ected. If, on the other hand, all households would be
eligible, the program would generate an e¤ect  among all eligibles, but would in addition also generate
a social e¤ect, because behavior in the peer group changes. Because all households in the peer group are
now more likely to participate in prevention, this creates an additional e¤ect on preventive behavior of
, this indirect e¤ect creates a second order e¤ect of 2, and so on. If all indirect e¤ects are added, the
resulting e¤ect is (1   ) 1, or the coe¢ cient of the indirect program e¤ect on individual behavior in
eq. (6).
5 Results
5.1 Estimation of neighborhood peer e¤ects
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Table 4 reports the main results of the neighborhood peer e¤ects estimates. Panel A provides the IV
estimates of the endogenous social interaction e¤ect, ; from eq. (3). It results from the estimates of
the two reduced-form equations, eqs. (5) and (6). Panel B reports the e¤ects of the former, while the
latter is presented in panel C. Estimates are reported both with and without controlling for individual and
household characteristics and contextual e¤ects. For adolescent and adult preventive care, the magnitude
of the spillover e¤ect estimates decreases once control variables are included. For child preventive care, the
opposite is found.23 Taking deworming drugs usage as an example, the results should be read as follows:
when the eligible fraction in the peer group of a non-eligible household living in a PROGRESA treated
village increases from zero to one, the average usage rate in the peer group increases by 13 percentage
points. This increase in peer group usage leads to a 4.8 percentage point increase in the usage of the
non-eligible household. The peer group responsiveness is generally stronger than the behavioral change
of non-eligibles, because the peer group partly consist of eligibles, whose behavioral change is nancially
stimulated. The relation between the peer group responsiveness and the individual responsiveness gives
the social interaction estimator. As the individual responsiveness increases relative to the peer group
responsiveness, this translates into a higher social interaction parameter.
The rst row in Table 4 indicates that social interaction e¤ects are present and signicant for four
types of preventive care, i.e. deworming drugs usage, blood pressure test, cervical cancer screening, and
growth monitoring. The magnitude of the social interaction e¤ect varies across the di¤erent types of
prevention. They are especially important for annual weight and growth monitoring of children. For
vaccination compliance, no e¤ects are found. For participation in blood sugar tests, minor positive e¤ects
are found, but estimated imprecisely.
We test for potential weakness of the instrumental variable using the Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic.
Contrary to the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic is robust to clustered
standard errors. The test shows that the instrument is, in general, not weak when controls are added,
except for vaccination compliance. This indicates an unreliable estimation of social interactions with
respect to vaccination compliance. The rejection of weak instruments for the other types of preventive
care supports the reliability of our baseline estimates.
What can we learn from the results in Tables 2 to 4? Immunization of children below 5 years
old against tuberculosis and measles has been generally adopted before PROGRESA was set up and
23Especially the inclusion of contextual e¤ects Xg and of the fraction of poor in the community Pg have an important
inuence on the changes in coe¢ cient point estimates. Their omission creates some bias at rst sight. However, the point
estimates are statistically not signicantly di¤erent from each other.
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compliance among this group of children increased further as they aged. Vaccination compliance was
not di¤erent between eligibles and non-eligibles in control and treatment villages. Table 3 shows no
PROGRESA e¤ect among eligibles or non-eligibles. The lack of direct impact of PROGRESA explains
the absence of indirect social interaction e¤ects.
Participation in annual growth and weight monitoring of children was high before PROGRESA started
and increased to almost full participation one year later. Pre-program monitoring according to PRO-
GRESAs guidelines was much lower. Less than a third of all children below 5 years were monitored
regularly, but compliance more than tripled among treated eligibles after one program year. It increased
slightly less among the other groups. The increase in child monitoring on an annual basis and according to
PROGRESA frequency is 6.2 and 12.3 percentage higher among the eligibles in treatment villages than in
control villages, respectively, providing evidence of a PROGRESA treatment e¤ect. The results in Table
4 show the presence of endogenous social interactions for annual monitoring, as well as for monitoring at
PROGRESA frequency.
With respect to adolescent and adult preventive health care, the patterns are similar, but the actual
magnitude of the e¤ects di¤er. Despite a relatively high prevalence of diabetes and cervical cancer in
Mexico (see Section 2.1), participation rates for cervical cancer screening and blood sugar test were low.
The pre-program participation for households in our sample was below 25% for eligibles and a little above
25% for non-eligibles. Take-up of blood pressure tests and the usage of deworming drugs was higher and
uctuated between 35% and 50%. In Tables 2 and 3, we observe a large increase in preventive take-up
in all layers of the population for all four types of prevention. The increase among eligibles in treatment
villages is, however, much more pronounced, allowing us to conclude that there was an important direct
e¤ect of the stimuli to attend preventive check-ups. The change in behavior among non-eligibles was also
systematically higher in treatment villages than in control villages, the di¤erence is, however, small, and
not signicant for blood sugar tests. Our social interaction estimates in Table 4 suggest that the spillover
e¤ects from eligibles to non-eligibles are (partly) the result of social interactions, with signicant e¤ects
for deworming drugs usage, participation in cervical cancer screening and take-up of blood pressure tests.
For blood sugar tests, the social interaction e¤ect is not signicantly di¤erent from zero once control
variables and contextual e¤ects are added.
We conclude that PROGRESA had a direct e¤ect on preventive behavior, especially among the treated
households. The results show that non-eligible families in treated villages also changed their preventive
behavior, albeit to a lesser extent. Social interactions play a positive reinforcing role in the transmission.
It is not entirely clear what is driving the social interaction e¤ect, pure conformity or informational
25
conformity or a combination of both.
5.2 Direct versus indirect e¤ect
In the PROGRESA program, policymakers give nancial stimuli to poor households in order to change
their preventive health behavior. In the previous subsection, we have shown that the e¤ect of PROGRESA
among eligibles in treated villages is important. We have equally shown that a social interaction e¤ect
exists that reinforces the behavioral change related to the direct nancial incentive and triggers behavioral
changes among non-eligibles. For policymaking, it is important to understand what part of the change
in behavior can be attributed to the nancial stimulus and what part is related to social interactions.
Table 5 presents the decomposition of the total treatment e¤ect of PROGRESA on eligibles and non-
eligibles in a direct and an indirect e¤ect. The analysis is performed for all types of preventive care except
vaccination, since in the previous sections, we have found no indication of a direct or indirect e¤ect for
child immunization. Panel A shows the results for the eligibles and panel B for the non-eligibles. Only the
indirect e¤ect plays for the latter. Row 1 in panel A shows the estimation of the direct e¤ect as laid down
in eq. (7), while row 4 shows the indirect e¤ect. The direct e¤ect is always signicant and it varies from
a 3 percentage point increase in growth monitoring on an annual base to a 18.5 percentage point increase
in the take-up of blood sugar tests. The indirect e¤ect is smaller and increases participation rates in
prevention by 1.5 to 6.5 percentage points. It is, in general, smaller among the non-eligibles than among
the eligibles. This is a result of a di¤erent composition of the peer groups of eligibles and non-eligibles
living in treatment villages. The fraction of eligible households in the peer group of an eligible household
is higher than in the peer group of a non-eligible household.24 As the fraction of eligibles increases, a
larger share of households are a¤ected by the direct e¤ect, which leads to a stronger change in average
peer group behavior, consequently leading to more important indirect e¤ects as well.
The total treatment e¤ect (row 5) is the combination of the direct and indirect e¤ect. If we calculate
the share of the indirect e¤ect in the total treatment e¤ect, we nd that social interactions amount to
16% of the total change in cervical cancer prevention. It increases up to around 20% for deworming drugs
usage and blood pressure test and 46% and 58% for child growth and weight monitoring, respectively at
PROGRESA frequency and on an annual base. At least for these types of preventive care, it appears
that social interactions explain a non-negligible part of the change in preventive behavior that is observed
after the introduction of PROGRESA.
24For example, in the subsample of cervical cancer screening, the fraction of other eligible households in the peer group
of a (treated) eligible household is 60%, whereas it is only 44% in the peer group of a non-eligible household.
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Table 5: Decomposition of total treatment e¤ect of PROGRESA
Dependent variable: Deworming Cancer Blood sugar Blood pressure Monitoring Monitoring
Changes in drugs usage screening test test (yearly) (Progresa)
A. Eligibles
1. Direct treatment e¤ect 0.088*** 0.150*** 0.185*** 0.171*** 0.030y 0.079**
(Standard error) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.037)
2. Social interaction parameter 0.386* 0.247* 0.145 0.288** 0.637*** 0.530**
(Standard error) (0.218) (0.131) (0.154) (0.127) (0.214) (0.227)
3. PROGRESA e¤ect on peer group 0.069*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.142*** 0.065*** 0.124***
(Standard error) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)
4. Indirect e¤ect (2 x 3) 0.026y 0.029* 0.017 0.041** 0.041** 0.066**
(Standard error) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.030)
5. Total treatment e¤ect (1 + 4) 0.114*** 0.179*** 0.202*** 0.212*** 0.072*** 0.145***
(Standard error) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.048)
Indirect e¤ect as % of total e¤ect 22.5% 16.3% 8.5% 19.3% 57.7% 45.5%
B. Non-eligibles
1. Direct treatment e¤ect 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Standard error)      
2. Social interaction parameter 0.386* 0.247** 0.145 0.288** 0.637*** 0.530**
(Standard error) (0.218) (0.131) (0.154) (0.127) (0.214) (0.227)
3. PROGRESA e¤ect on peer group 0.056*** 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.110*** 0.067*** 0.100***
(Standard error) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022)
4. Indirect e¤ect (2 x 3) 0.021y 0.022* 0.014 0.032** 0.043** 0.053**
(Standard error) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026)
5. Total treatment e¤ect (1 + 4) 0.021y 0.022* 0.014 0.032** 0.043** 0.053**
(Standard error) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026)
Note: Coe¢ cients in rows 1 are the result of estimating eq. 7 on the sample of eligibles and non-eligibles combined. Coe¢ cients in rows 2 come
from Table 4. Coe¢ cients in rows 3 are the result of an OLS regression of change in average peer group value on "treatment village" and control
variables. All coe¢ cients in rows 1 to 3 have robust standard errors that allow for correlation of disturbance terms within localities. Standard errors
in rows 4 and 5 are computed using the Delta method. Signicance levels of coe¢ cients: y p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
Table 6: Descriptive evidence on health supply, quality and price changes
Pre-program Post-program
Treatment Control Di¤erence (SD) Treatment Control Di¤erence (SD)
Health care provider present (0=No, 1=Yes) 0.959 0.945 0.014 (0.022) 0.960 0.968 -0.007 (0.017)
Services available (0 to 7) 2.727 2.958 -0.232 (0.217) 3.556 3.368 0.188 (0.235)
Opening time (hours per week) 10.443 10.233 0.210 (0.267) 9.233 9.192 0.041 (0.226)
Availability sta¤ and equipment (0 to 1) 0.577 0.561 0.015 (0.017) 0.575 0.586 -0.012 (0.016)
Quality of doctors (0 to 1) 0.972 0.976 -0.004 (0.003) 0.960 0.957 0.002 (0.008)
Quality of nurses (0 to 1) 0.959 0.960 -0.001 (0.005) 0.952 0.956 -0.003 (0.007)
Clear explanation given (0=No, 1=Yes) 0.986 0.978 0.007 (0.003)** 0.979 0.985 -0.006 (0.003)*
Waiting time (minutes per visit) 55.418 59.054 -3.636 (2.416)y 55.769 58.958 -3.189 (1.871)*
Visit time (minutes per visit) 41.107 37.019 4.088 (3.857) 28.156 34.077 -5.920 (2.362)**
Note: Mean pre-program values are reported as measured in March 1998. Mean post-program values are reported as measured in October 1998 and/or March
1999. Di¤erences are estimated using OLS regression with robust standard errors that allow for correlation of disturbance terms within localities. Signicance
levels of di¤erences: y p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
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6 Health care supply and quality
An important element that was neglected until now are changes in health supply that might stem from
the implementation of PROGRESA. Agurto et al. (2004), for example, conclude from focus groups and
interviews that, amongst others, time costs, courtesy of providers, inadequacy of counseling, and poor
quality material and instruments are important barriers to participation in cervical cancer screening in
Mexico and other Latin American countries. Similar e¤ects could play for other types of preventive care.
Changes in o¤ered services, quality, or prices could thus perfectly lead to the observed changes in health
demand and behavior. The di¤erential increase in preventive health behavior between treatment and
control villages might be the result of improvements in health supply or quality in treatment villages
relative to control villages or to a change in (time) costs to attend medical services for non-eligibles.
The survey data contain information that makes it possible to test this mechanism. Pre- and post-
program information is available on the type of health care providers that are located in or around the
locality, the type of services o¤ered, the opening time, the perceived quality (su¢ cient sta¤ and material,
clear explanation of problem, quality of doctors and quality of nurses), and the waiting and visit time.25
Information on health care providers and services are at the locality level, the other data are recorded at
the household level. However, we average the household level information at the locality level, since only
a limited number of households have provided the information and restricting our subsamples further to
this group would eliminate many observations and potentially create bias. In Table 6, the pre- and post-
program values are indicated for treatment and control villages as well as the di¤erences. Table 6 shows
that almost all localities have at least one health care provider (which was a program requirement). The
number of services is similar in treatment and control villages and has increased slightly after PROGRESA
started. Only 60% of the households agree that there is su¢ cient sta¤ and equipment in the medical
centres, a percentage that is stable over time. The quality of the sta¤ is perceived as high, households
are very satised with doctors, nurses and the explanation they are given. Waiting time is shorter in
treatment villages, but does not change after program implementation. Finally, visit time in treatment
villages reduces by more than 25%, while for control villages, the di¤erence between pre- and post-
program visit time is not signicant. Shortening the visit time might be the chosen solution to deal with
25We construct the following variables: a dummy variable that indicates whether any provider (hospital, doctor, health
aid or midwife) was available in the locality. A variable, ranging from 0 to 7, indicating the number of services available in
the locality (pre-natal care, delivery care, baby care, immunization, family planning service, hospitalization, diarrhea care).
Opening time in hours per week. An index score, ranging from 0 to 1 for the availability of sta¤ and equipment, based on 4
yes/no questions (has medical centre su¢ cient doctors?, nurses?, medication?, material?). An index score, ranging from 0
to 1 for the quality of doctors, based on 4 yes/no questions (is doctor respectful?, prepared?, responsible? and trustable?).
A similar quality index variable for nurses. A dummy indicating whether doctors provide clear information. Waiting time
and visit time are indicated in minutes per visit. We limit the boundaries for visit time. Visit time below 5 minutes is
changed to 5 minutes and visit time is capped at 1 hour.
28
Table 7: Social interaction estimates when controlling for changes in health care supply and quality ()
1. Baseline 2. Health supply 3. Health supply 4. Health supply,
and quality quality and time
Deworming drugs usage 0.368* 0.426** 0.511*** 0.489**
(Standard error) (0.218) (0.200) (0.183) (0.192)
Cervical cancer screening 0.247* 0.267** 0.273** 0.268*
(Standard error) (0.131) (0.129) (0.134) (0.142)
Blood sugar test 0.145 0.162 0.255** 0.263**
(Standard error) (0.154) (0.150) (0.124) (0.126)
Blood pressure test 0.288** 0.328*** 0.372*** 0.375***
(Standard error) (0.127) (0.119) (0.113) (0.116)
Monitoring (yearly) 0.637*** 0.662*** 0.640*** 0.713***
(Standard error) (0.214) (0.197) (0.208) (0.191)
Monitoring (PROGRESA) 0.530** 0.508** 0.519** 0.550***
(Standard error) (0.227) (0.229) (0.228) (0.207)
Note: Social interaction estimates from IV regressions are reported with robust standard errors that allow for correlation of
disturbance terms within localities. Signicance levels of coe¢ cients: y p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Individual and
household controls are those listed in the Tables with descriptive evidence, i.e. Tables 10 to 16.
For cervical cancer screening, the regression controls for the number of females aged 16 or more in the household.
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
the inux of eligibles in the health care system of treatment villages.
In Table 7, the regression results are reported when controls for health supply, quality and waiting
and visit time are subsequently added. Column 1 reproduces the baseline results, for all prevention types
except vaccination where social interaction e¤ects are non-existent. Controlling for health provision
characteristics, the social interaction estimates are in line with or higher than the baseline results.26 If
anything, our results get more signicant and convincing.
7 Robustness and alternative hypotheses
In order to support the validity of the results shown in Tables 4 and 5, it is important to discuss alternative
channels that might have generated the observed changes in preventive health behavior of non-eligible
households in treatment villages. In a series of robustness tests, we will address four mechanisms that
provide alternative explanations for the social interaction e¤ects that we have identied. The rst column
reproduces the baseline estimates of Table 4.
26Especially the e¤ects of doctors who provide a clear explanation and doctor quality play an important role. However,
none of the new point estimates is signicantly di¤erent from the baseline estimates.
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First, it might be that eligible households share the PROGRESA benets they receive with non-eligible
households in their locality and that part of the shared resources are used to increase medical consumption.
Adato (2000) concludes from focus group research that sharing of benets is rare, since benets are
perceived as small and used primarily by eligible households to nance schooling costs (Lalive & Cattaneo,
2009), increase food consumption and food quality, and buy clothing (Bobonis, 2004; Hoddinott &
Skouas, 2004). The increase in expenditures by eligible households might indirectly benet non-eligible
households if the additional expenditures are realized in shops owned by non-eligibles. This is, however,
not the case since only 20 out of the 506 villages have a local supermarket or street market (Lalive &
Cattaneo, 2009). Nonetheless, Angelucci & De Giorgi (2009) present evidence that non-eligible households
in treatment villages have received more gifts and loans since PROGRESA was rolled out. The additional
resources are used to increase food consumption levels but are not su¢ cient to cover the increase in food
expenditures. It appears that little additional money is available for increased medical consumption.
Moreover, it seems that medical expenses are not prioritized. In the March 1998 baseline survey, it is
asked what the top priority would be to spend additional monthly household resources. Medication was
among the possible answers, and was only prioritized by 2% of the households (see Table 9). Food is
pre-eminently given the highest priority. Other researchers have found no clear evidence of consumption
or income externalities that might provide an alternative explanation for social spillovers (e.g. Bobonis
& Finan, 2009; Lalive & Cattaneo, 2009). Given the limited evidence of income spillovers in treatment
villages and the fact that increases in nancial resources are primarily used to nance food consumption,
we argue that this channel provides no good alternative explanation for the results shown in Tables 4
and 5. However, since the PROGRESA survey from October 1998 contains information on received gifts,
we include the available information as a robustness check for income spillovers. In column 2 in Table 8,
the social interaction e¤ects are estimated while controling for the amount of monetary gifts a household
has received and dummies for receiving food and clothes through in kind gifts. As expected, the results
indicate that the inclusion of these controls has no e¤ect on the social interaction estimates.
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Table 9: First priority in spending additional monthly household resources (% of households)
All households Non-eligible households
Food consumption 77.0% 74.4%
Debt payment and saving 6.6% 7.8%
Housing expenses 5.4% 6.1%
Clothing and shoes 4.9% 4.7%
Investments in agriculture (seeds, animals, tools) 3.2% 3.9%
Medication 1.6% 1.9%
School supplies 1.0% 0.9%
Other expenditures (alcohol, toys, entertainment) 0.2% 0.3%
Source: PROGRESA evaluation data
Second, it might be the case that institutional, local or environmental factors have played an impor-
tant role in the increase in preventive care behavior among the non-eligibles in treatment villages. In
column 3, state dummies are added. Our di¤erence in di¤erence approach already captured time invari-
ant geographic e¤ects. Including dummies in the regressions controls for changes at the state level that
occurred at the same time as the implementation of PROGRESA. The introduction of geographic varia-
tion has little e¤ect on the social interaction estimates. Estimates for cervical cancer screening lose their
signicance. The new point estimate is, however, not signicantly di¤erent from the baseline estimate.
In column 4, we add dummies for natural disasters (drought, ood, earthquake, frost, pest and a residual
category) that occurred between April 1998 and March 1999. The information is household specic, but
we also add peer group averages. The results are in line with the baseline.
A third mechanism is that non-eligible households misunderstood their eligibility status or anticipated
future eligibility and changed their preventive health behavior. This is unlikely to be the case, since
households were notied clearly about their eligibility status. Moreover, eligibility was awarded until
at least November 1999 and during this period non-eligible or new households were not able to attain
eligibility status, irrespective of income or behavior (Angelucci & De Giorgi, 2009). Nevertheless, we test
this possibility by removing the 25% non-eligible households that are closest to the poverty cut-o¤ point.
The idea is that these households are most likely to be in doubt with their eligibility status or inuenced
by anticipation e¤ects. If anticipation e¤ects would drive our results, the estimates in column 5 would
show a reduced social interaction coe¢ cient. The results correspond to the baseline, except for growth
monitoring at PROGRESA frequency, where social interactions get less important and lose signicance.
The coe¢ cient of the latter is also less precisely estimated. If the baseline standard errors would apply
on the new point estimate, it would still be signicant at the 10% level.
A nal possibility is that disease-specic elements explain the observed e¤ects. For cervical cancer,
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it might be that some individuals have better information on risk factors than others or engage in more
risky sexual behavior, which might explain participation di¤erences. In the pre-implementation data,
information on contraceptive use and knowledge is present. In the cervical cancer screening regression,
we add dummies for having ever used contraception, not being familiar with contraception, and having
a partner or other relative that is against contraception. Results are shown in column 6. Infections by
parasitic diseases are linked to public hygiene and sanitation (Meredith et al., 2013). Households living
in localities with sewer systems and public water networks may feel less inclined to use deworming drugs,
because parasitic infections are less common. If sewer systems or water networks are more common in
control villages, this can explain lower usage rates. In the regression for deworming drugs usage, we add
dummies for a public sewer system and a public water network in the locality. We do not expect to see
any e¤ects if the randomization of villages was successful, which is conrmed by the results in column
6. Moreover the regression results show that households living in localities with a sewer system use
fewer deworming drugs and women whose partners are opposed to contraception use are more inclined
to screen for cancer. Although it is not entirely clear what explains the latter e¤ect, it might be the
case that these women are aware of the risk factors for HPV infection, i.e. more skin-to-skin contact
through sexual intercourse, earlier pregnancies (women who were younger than 17 when having their rst
full-term pregnancy are more likely to develop cervical cancer), and more pregnancies (women who have
more than 3 full-term pregancies have increased risk for developing cervical cancer).
In the last column, di¤erent channels are combined. We control at the same time for income spillovers,
geographic e¤ects, environmental disasters, disease specic information and health supply, quality and
time e¤ects. The combined robustness results are again in line with the baseline results.
8 Conclusion
Individual participation in preventive health care may depend on preventive health behavior in the peer
group of the individual. This paper analyzes the importance of social interactions in the context of
new social policies in Mexico that aim to increase health care usage among a targeted subgroup of the
population. We followed the promising approach of analyzing social interactions in real world peer groups.
We exploited the partial-population design with random variation in eligibility status of households and
in treatment status of localities in PROGRESA for the identication of social interactions.
Results indicate that PROGRESA was successful in increasing preventive care usage among the eli-
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gible households. Non-eligible households in treatment villages have also changed their preventive health
behavior more than their counterparts in control villages, providing evidence of spillover e¤ects. We were
able to isolate endogenous social interactions from contextual and correlated e¤ects - under weak assump-
tions - and showed that social interaction e¤ects are present for deworming drugs usage, cervical cancer
screening, blood pressure tests and child growth and weight monitoring. No social interactions are found
for immunization of children and for blood sugar tests. The results are robust to the inclusion of health
supply, quality and waiting time controls as well as income spillover through gifts, geographic variation,
environmental shocks, anticipation e¤ects and specic disease related information. The magnitude of the
social interaction e¤ects di¤ers between the di¤erent types of prevention.
Using the information on social interactions, the total treatment e¤ect can be decomposed in a direct
e¤ect, related to the nancial incentive given to eligible households for complying with PROGRESA
requirements, and an indirect e¤ect related to informational and pure conformity e¤ects. The total treat-
ment e¤ect indicates that participation in prevention among eligibles increased as much as 20 percentage
points for blood sugar and blood pressure tests, around 15 percentage points for cervical cancer screening
and growth monitoring at PROGRESA frequency, 11 percentage points for deworming drugs usage and
7 percentage points for annual monitoring. The latter started with a pre-program participation rate
well above 80%. The indirect e¤ect due to social interactions accounts for 10% up to 58% of the total
treatment e¤ect for the eligibles, i.e. a non-negligible share.
Evidence of the presence and magnitude of social interactions is important, regardless of the underlying
mechanisms that cause them. It is important for policymaking since social interactions could reinforce or
o¤set the direct incentives given by a social program that aims to inuence the individual participation
decision. Important (positive) social interaction e¤ects might also support a high adoption equilibrium
after direct nancial incentives are cut back or removed. In our case, positive, reinforcing e¤ects are
found, that amplify participation both of eligibles and non-eligibles. Thus, by targeting the extreme
poor, PROGRESA has succeeded to improve not only their health care usage, but also that of their
non-eligible neighbors. As Barham (2005), Gertler (2000, 2004) and Skouas (2005) have shown, this is
translated in health improvements for children and adults in PROGRESA localities and is a potential
gamechanger in the human capital accumulation of these children and households.
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